Iraq: After the elections

By Dennis Murphy

Background
In mid-2003, after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, US administrator Paul Bremer tried to impose an Iraqi constitution drafted by a hand-picked group of appointees. Bremer was opposed by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who issued a religious ruling, or fatwa, saying that only an elected body could write such a constitution. Fearful of a confrontation with the revered Shia leader, Bremer backed down.

In November that year Bremer tried to install a puppet ‘governing council’. His plan angered many Iraqis, and tens of thousands of Shias demonstrated in protest. Sistani issued another fatwa, saying that nothing short of direct elections would be tolerable. The US argued that Iraq was too disorderly for direct elections and that electoral rolls couldn't be compiled until a complete national census was held. Sistani disagreed, pointing out that ration cards had been issued to every Iraqi family by Saddam Hussein's regime. These cards, he argued, could be used as registration documents for elections. The US backed down once again.

This non-violent and broad-based Shia resistance forced the US to hold elections — something it had tried to avoid at all costs. Once it had no alternative, of course, it put a positive spin on things by announcing the elections as a US initiative.

The elections
75 seats were contested by a total of 7,471 candidates, and voting was by the rules of proportional representation: to win a seat, a successful candidate would need to obtain 1/275th of the vote. A party that won (say) 30% of the total votes would win 30% of the total seats. Once elected, the body of representatives must draft a constitution, which in turn has to be ratified by a popular referendum.

The turnout was estimated at 60 per cent of Iraq's 15 million registered voters. The primary beneficiary of the result will be the Shia community, which turned out in great numbers to assert their rights. Four Sunni-majority provinces containing almost half the country's population experienced a much smaller turnout. It is quite likely, therefore, that the Shias will win a huge majority in the so-called Transitional National Assembly.

Issues for the US occupation
The US will have to deal with a number of problems. First, it will have to find a way to include the Sunnis in a power-sharing arrangement. But such an outcome would have to occur at the expense of the Shias, who would resist being deprived of the fruits of their electoral victory. The US will be keen to ensure that the armed insurgency, which is largely Sunni-based, does not turn into a national uprising.

Second, it will have to cope with the fact that many people voted in order to end the occupation. The US, by contrast, has no intention of leaving. Its war aims were to establish a permanent military presence in Iraq, and it will have to deal with popular opposition to its ongoing presence. Perhaps it plans to simply ignore this opposition. This may be why it announced that it would maintain a military presence of 120,000 troops until 2007 and beyond, despite calls for withdrawal.

Third, it will have to deal with the vexed issue of Kurdish secession. Iraq's four million Kurds voted, but are keen to maintain a quasi-separate political existence. Turkey, the US's ally, is no doubt watching this development anxiously.

Fourth, the US will have to prevent the natural inclinations of a Shia-majority Iraq to strengthen relations with Iran. While Iraq's Shias show no sign of wanting to be part of Iran, they would like good relations with it. This would undermine US policy, developed over many years, to isolate it.

Regional implications
A democratic, Shia-controlled Iraq would inspire other Shias in the eastern (oil-rich) regions of Saudi Arabia, as well as in parts of Kuwait. Such a prospect terrifies some Arab leaders, whose Sunni leadership would be threatened as a result. Shias, long disenfranchised by the Ottomans, the British and the pro-US dictators, are likely to become a powerful political force.

It is clear, therefore, that the occupation of Iraq has unleashed forces that are not entirely within the control of the world's sole superpower. It must find a way to prevent an armed insurgency from becoming a war of national liberation. And it must cope with a tectonic change in regional politics. The year 2005 may be a watershed for its image of global invincibility.

Sources:
Dan Murphy, “Iraq's critical Sistani factor”, Christian Science Monitor, 20 January 05. Robert Fisk, “Amid tragedy, defiance: millions vote beside suicide bombers”, The Independent, 31 Jan 05